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Disseminating the Policy Narrative of ‘Heritage under Threat’ in 
China 
Originating from within the UNESCO, narratives on ‘heritage under threat’ tell 
the story of how and why intangible cultural heritage (ICH) practices are 
valuable, why they disappearing and how they can be protected from destruction. 
Focusing on the PR China, this paper conducts a frame analysis to identify 
narratives on ‘heritage under threat’ as employed by the UNESCO, the Chinese 
party-state and academics. The study argues that while policy narratives in any 
country undergo a process of congruence-building, circulation, and 
implementation, these processes take distinctive forms in authoritarian countries 
due to the states’ discursive and political monopoly: While non-state actors are 
involved, the state primarily steers the appropriation process. Nevertheless, once 
established, the policy narrative transforms across time and space, enabling local 
actors to use it to pursue their own interests. 
Keywords: Narratives, policy, intangible cultural heritage, UNESCO, China 
Introduction 
When the UNESCO 1  adopted its Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible 
Cultural Heritage (ICHC) in 2003, it called for the protection of traditional cultural 
practices worldwide. Intangible cultural heritage (ICH) meaning ‘the practices, 
representations, expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, 
artefacts and cultural spaces associated therewith’ (UNESCO 2003a) and its protection 
were put on the international agenda. Thereafter, international and domestic ICH 
policies have disseminated narratives on the need to protect ‘threatened’ and 
‘disappearing’ traditional culture. The main ‘culprits’ are globalization, modernization 
and urbanization. Due to  rapid socio-economic change and a perceived Westernization 
                                                 
1 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 
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of culture worldwide, state and non-state actors have begun mobilizing to protect 
traditions from extinction, appropriating and transforming these narratives to 
problematize domestic protection of ICH.  
As the case of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) demonstrates, policy narratives 
can have a major impact on pre-existing domestic conceptualizations and practices of 
traditional culture. Although a lot of traditional Chinese culture had previously been 
criticized as ‘feudal’ and ‘superstitious’, since China’s reforms in the 1980s, and 
particularly since adoption of the ICH Convention in 2004, Chinese cultural traditions 
have undergone reevaluation. Focusing on congruence-building, circulation and 
implementation processes, this paper employs the method of frame analysis (Creed, 
Langstraat, and Scully 2002; Bondes and Heep 2012) to identify policy narratives of 
‘heritage under threat’ as employed by the UNESCO, the Chinese party-state and 
Chinese academics.  
I argue that while policy narratives in any country undergo a process of congruence-
building, circulation, and implementation, enabling actors to use the narrative as a 
political tool, it takes distinctive forms in authoritarian countries. This study 
demonstrates that due to authoritarian states’ discursive and political monopoly, more 
perhaps than in democratic settings, state actors are able to steer the process in a top-
down manner and circulation is more confined to the official verbatim phrasing of the 
narrative. While the policy narrative can be used to legitimize state as well as non-state 
activities, it can also undermine its original purpose: protecting cultural heritage. 
Examining how international ICH policy narratives have been appropriated in China is 
thus significant to understand they change during appropriation, circulation and 
implementation processes in an authoritarian political system. Moreover, I propose a 
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novel methodological approach to structurally compare policy narratives and their 
evolution over time using frame analysis. 
Domestic Appropriation of International Policy Narratives 
There is a long academic tradition of studying how discursive and ideational processes 
influence international and domestic politics. Scholars have studied international 
discourses (Levitt and Merry 2009) or how the international diffusion and transfer of 
policies influences domestic politics (Dolowitz and Marsh 1996; Rogers 2003; Maggetti 
and Gilardi 2013). International organizations (Stone 2004; Shipan and Volden 2012) 
and transnational actors, groups and networks (Haas 1992; Mintrom 1997; Balla 2001) 
play a key facilitating role hereby. Through their promotion, international discourses 
and inherent narratives enter domestic policy narratives. 
The domestic appropriation of foreign policy narratives results in their transformation. 
Concerning the domestic appropriation of international ideas and norms, many scholars 
(Acharya 2004; Levitt and Merry 2009) agree that it is necessary to build congruence 
between the old and the new. According to Levitt and Merry (2009) this congruence-
building process is shaped by actors’ cognitive maps and cultural categories. In what 
they call ‘vernacularization’ of international ideas, ‘Vernacularizers take the ideas and 
practices of one group and present them in terms that another group will accept’ (2009, 
446). They claim that to understand vernacularization processes, one needs to examine 
how ideas and norms are appropriated and why, who was involved and what 
implications this appropriation has (Levitt and Merry 2009, 453). To understand the 
domestic appropriation of foreign policy narratives it is thus similarly important to 
examine processes of congruence-building, circulation and implementation. 
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The PRC, like many other countries, has been strongly influenced by the domestic 
appropriation of foreign policy narratives. Adopting Marxist-Leninist thought,  the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) attempted to rework popular memory of the past along 
a narrative of class antagonism. Disseminating this narrative, as Anagnost (1997) notes, 
‘represented for the party the process of merging the consciousness of the party with 
that of “the people”, which legitimated its claim to represent the voice of the masses’ 
(1997, 32). After commencing reforms in 1978, the party-state continued to rely on 
narratives to influence its citizens’ perception of the past. Examining museums, Denton 
(2005), for instance, has demonstrated how historical narratives have changed from 
promoting a socialist narrative of martyrdom and revolutionary liberation to fostering 
narratives supporting market reform.  
Heritage programs and policies similarly disseminate particular narratives which use the 
past for present objectives. After joining the World Heritage Convention (WHC) in 
1985, the party-state appropriated the notion of ‘authenticity’- a key concept of the 
WHC - incorporating it in Chinese heritage policies (Zhu 2015) to legitimize domestic 
heritage conservation (Yan 2015). Yet when appropriating UNESCO discourses, as Yan 
(2015) argues, the party-state attempts to build congruence by incorporating the 
Confucian notion of harmony and narratives associated with public health and morality. 
Appropriating UNESCO policy narratives, however, does not only legitimize domestic 
heritage conservation. According to Shepherd (2009), the inscription of Tibet heritage 
sites on the World Heritage List strengthens Chinese political claim over Tibet, thereby 
‘transforming these sites into elements in the state narrative of Chinese culture and 
civilization’ (2009, 250). The Chinese party-state thus uses international organizations 
such as the UNESCO and its inherent discourses and narratives to legitimize domestic 
political objectives. As Svensson (2016) notes, ‘The official Chinese heritage discourse 
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still serves to justify the rule of the Communist Party and its interpretation of history. It 
is expressed in different policies and laws, and in the selection of protected heritage 
sites at national, provincial, district and county levels’ (Svensson 2016, 37). As in other 
countries (Bendix, Eggert and Peselmann 2012), elements of UNESCO discourses and 
narratives are thus incorporated in Chinese policy narratives to foster state objectives.  
Local communities, however, commonly engage in bottom-up contestation of these 
official policy narratives (Maags and Svensson 2018). Local communities have 
challenged official heritage narratives and practices (Yan 2015; Zhu 2015). Therefore, 
Zhang and Wu (2016) have argued for the existence of multiple Chinese heritage 
discourses, which entail different cultural meanings, values and traditions. Besides 
celebrating local identities and interpretations of the past, NGOs, social networks, 
intellectuals and journalists at times challenge official heritage policies and narratives 
(Svensson 2016, 38).  
This article employs the method of frame analysis to demonstrate how narratives of 
‘heritage under threat’ employed in UNESCO Conventions are appropriated, circulated 
and implemented in China by different international and domestic actors. After 
introducing the theoretical and methodological approach, the study will familiarize the 
reader with the evolution of narratives within UNESCO Conventions, as well as how 
they were strategically appropriated, circulated and implemented in China. 
Policy Narratives and Frames 
Before examining Chinese appropriation of UNESCO policy narratives, it is necessary 
to clarify what I mean by ‘policy narratives’ and how I propose to examine them. 
Narratives are essentially stories ‘which create and shape social meaning by imposing a 
coherent interpretation on the whirl of events and actions around us’ (Fischer 2003, 
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161). Following Shanahan, McBeth, and Hathaway (2011) ‘these narrative facets 
constitute a policy narrative when the author or group strategically constructs the story 
to try to win the desired policy outcome’ (2011, 375). In this process of creating policy 
narratives, ‘scientific uncertainty is translated into political certainty by the use of 
dominant stories in the policy process’ (Radaelli 1999, 671). It is imperative to create a 
storyline to frame an issue as a problem. As Stone (2011) notes, “most definitions of 
policy problems have narrative structure, however subtle. Problem definitions are 
stories with a beginning, middle, and an end, involving some change or transformation. 
They have heroes and villains and innocent victims, and they pit forces of evil against 
forces of good” (2011, 158).  
Policy narratives are thus intentionally constructed stories including information 
concerning why policy problems and how they can be solved. Therefore, policy 
narratives commonly appear in the process of political agenda-setting and problem 
formulation (see also Gusfield 1980, Zittoun 2009) and have a significant impact on 
policy implementation (Fischer 2003, 161), by creating a framework for interpreting 
these socio-political events. In short, policy narratives are embedded in socio-political, 
moral and cultural contexts and disseminate a causal story about causes and effects of a 
certain problem to legitimize policy, form public opinion or trigger action (Radaelli 
1999; Cramb 2009).  
This paper conceptually understands narratives comprising a number of ‘frames’. I 
recognize that it difficult to distinguish between narratives and frames, as they are often 
used interchangeably or lumped together. According to Goffman (1974), frames render 
‘a meaningless aspect of the scene into something that is meaningful’ (1974, 21). In 
contrast, according to Shanahan, McBeth and Hathaway (2011), narratives ‘constitute a 
policy narrative when the author or group strategically constructs the story to try to win 
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the desired policy outcome’ (2011, 375). Yet Schön and Rein, for instance speak of a 
‘frame-narrative’ which relates to ‘a particular kind of ‘‘normative-prescriptive’’ story 
that provides a sense of what the problem is and what should be done about it’ (Schön 
und Rein 1996, 89), thus lumping the two together. Other scholars have pointed out, 
that narratives are different from frames as narratives have ‘a beginning, a middle and 
an end’ (Roe 1994, 114; Stone 2011: 158). In contrast to narratives, following Benford 
and Snow (2000), frames are frequently ‘aligned’, thus joined together, in order to 
mobilize for collective action.  
Both concepts are difficult to differentiate because they both are constructed in a 
strategic manner (Snow et al. 1986, 478; Shanahan, McBeth, and Hathaway 2011, 375) 
for the sake of triggering action (Benford and Snow 2000; Stone 2011, 13). Frames and 
narratives thus share the discursive element of a story and an inherent strategically 
chosen plan for action. They share similar characteristics precisely because narratives 
are made up of frames. This paper therefore understands policy narratives to consist of 
various frames aligned in a causal order of “beginning, middle and end” to tell a story.  
By assuming that narratives comprise a variety of frames, the researcher can more 
easily examine the inherent structure of a given narrative. In doing so, this paper is in 
line with Shanahan, McBeth, and Hathaway’s (2011) argument that ‘policy narratives 
do contain frames that develop problem definitions based on the inclusion of some 
evidences and not other information to bolster a particular policy outcome’ (2011, 375). 
Selecting inclusion of some frames (and information) over others is thus an important 
aspect of policy narrative analysis (see also Entman 1993).  
Policy narratives, as proposed by the author, comprise but are not limited to (1) a value 
frame which attaches meaning to an event or issue by creating a value system; (2) a 
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problem frame which uses ‘facts’ to establish the belief or acceptance of a policy 
problem and (3) an action frame which prescribes a certain action plan (see Fig. 1).  
 
Figure 1. Examining Policy Narratives through Frame Analysis 
 
(Source: Author) 
 
Frames and narratives should, however, be differentiated from other notions such as 
discourses. Hajer and Laws (2008), for instance, classify narratives as discourses (2008, 
260). Yet discourses are much larger than narratives, to the extent of linking various 
narratives into one entity. Following Smith (2006), for instance, the global heritage 
discourse ‘simultaneously draws on and naturalizes certain narratives and cultural and 
social experiences – often linked to ideas of nation and nationhood’ (2006, 4), thus 
going beyond the logic of a ‘beginning, a middle and an end’ and highlighting that 
discourses are not equivalent to but contain narratives. I therefore regard narratives as 
being on a different linguistic level than discourses (Martin and Ringham 2000, 51), 
functioning as a discursive strategy (Wodak and Meyer 2009, 65) within discourses. 
Understanding discourse in the Foucauldian sense, as ‘a form of power that circulates in 
the social field and can attach to strategies of domination as well as those of resistance’ 
(Diamond and Quinby 1988, 185), narrative of ‘heritage under threat’ is thus part of 
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heritage discourses exerting power by determining what heritage is and what it is not 
(Smith 2006). 
To examine how Chinese state and non-state actors differently appropriate and 
disseminate the international policy narrative of ‘heritage under threat’, this study 
employs the method of frame analysis (Creed, Langstraat and Scully 2002; Bondes and 
Heep 2012). The study examines how the narrative is discursively created by various 
actors in texts and speeches thereby disseminating certain problem, value or action 
frames. This method was chosen as this study aims to examine how international policy 
narratives inherently change when appropriated domestically and by different actors in 
an authoritarian country. In identifying inherent frames as subunits of a given policy 
narrative, it becomes possible to retrace even the smallest changes in its inherent 
structural logic. The study therefore focuses on a qualitative analysis of the discursive 
elements and strategies within the narratives and does not seek to explain causal effects, 
as for instance Shanahan, McBeth, and Hathaway (2011) propose in their Narrative 
Policy Analysis framework.  
The study’s frame analysis is based on an extensive study of UNESCO documents, 
official Chinese language policy papers, laws, media reports, academic articles as well 
as 55 qualitative semi-structured interviews with officials, cultural heritage ‘experts’ 
and local cultural practitioners. The empirical case of the PRC was chosen, firstly, since 
most policy narrative literature focuses on democratic settings, not authoritarian 
political systems. This case analysis can thus provide insights into how the 
appropriation, dissemination and implementation of policy narratives differ in a political 
context which extensively uses propaganda (Wu 1994). Secondly, as the PRC 
condemned traditional culture in the past, even destroying heritage during the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976) (Hou 2016, 497), examining the way the Chinese party-state 
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uses international policy narratives to protect domestic traditional culture today is of 
particular empirical interest. This is especially the case, as China, after joining the 
ICHC, has not only begun to strongly promote ICH domestically, but also 
internationally such as within the UNESCO (Bertacchini, Liuzza, and Meskell 2017). 
Creating a Policy Narrative of Threat at the UNESCO 
Originating from the UNESCO, the policy narrative of ‘heritage under threat’ tells the 
story of how and why heritage is disappearing (problem), why it constitutes a valuable 
part of society (value) and how it can be protected from ‘destruction’ (action). While the 
UNESCO’s first conventions aimed to prevent the destruction of cultural property 
during armed conflict (UNESCO 1954), the UNESCO soon identified socio-economic 
change as the main threat. In the 1972 WHC, for instance, the preamble commences by 
arguing that cultural and natural heritage ‘are increasingly threatened with destruction 
not only by the traditional causes of decay, but also by changing social and economic 
conditions which aggravate the situation with even more formidable phenomena of 
damage or destruction’ (UNESCO 1972). Since the 1970s, UNESCO’s international 
heritage conventions have thus incorporated a policy narrative of ‘heritage under threat’ 
highlighting natural decay and socio-economic changes.  
This problem frame is substantiated by scientific expertise, from UNESCO expert 
bodies such as ICOMOS, ICCROM and IUCN (UNESCO 2018a). The problem of 
‘heritage under threat’ is based on the value frame, arguing that traditional culture is of 
‘outstanding universal value from a historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological 
point of view’ (Art. 1) and should be preserved for future generations (Art. 4). The 
policy narrative furthermore includes other value-based concepts such as ‘outstanding 
universal value’, ‘authenticity’ or ‘cultural heritage of humanity’ (UNESCO 1972). Due 
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to its value, the WHC calls on States Parties to engage in international cooperation and 
domestic governmental ‘legal, scientific, technical, administrative and financial 
measures’ (Art. 5.4), for ‘counteracting the dangers that threaten its cultural or natural 
heritage’ (Art. 5.3) (UNESCO 1972) – which makes up the action frame. Through 
international conventions and related documents, the UNESCO thus created and 
disseminated a policy narrative which justifies and mobilizes governmental and societal 
action for heritage protection. 
UNESCO Conventions and their inherent narratives subsequently trigger action among 
their signatories, the States Parties. After signing the WHC, national governments 
implement it by, for instance, adopting laws and policies for heritage protection, 
establishing museums and identifying heritage sites for inclusion in domestic 
conservation programs (Bendix, Eggert and Peselmann 2012). Once a nomination 
dossier is presented to the UNESCO World Heritage Committee, the UNESCO 
advisory bodies, ICOMOS, IUCN and ICCROM evaluate whether the heritage sites 
meet the selection criteria. Heritage sites must be of ‘outstanding universal value’ and 
meet at least one of the ten selection criteria outlined in the WHC’s Operational 
Guidelines. The final decision lies with the World Heritage Committee, a group of 21 
elected States Parties to the Convention (UNESCO 2018b).  
National governments determine which domestic heritage site may be nominated for the 
UNESCO World Heritage List and the List of World Heritage in Danger. They have 
many reasons for implementing UNESCO Conventions. Besides the international 
recognition of governmental protection efforts, ‘having sites inscribed on the 
Convention’s list garners international and national prestige, enables access to the 
World Heritage Fund for monetary assistance, and brings the potential benefits of 
heightened public awareness, tourism, and economic development’ (Meskell 2013, 843). 
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Since the 1970s, the WHC has been subject to debate, ultimately leading to a reframing 
of its policy narrative. States Parties, particularly from developing countries, criticized 
that the WHC concept of ‘cultural heritage’ only incorporated the protection of material, 
grand forms of culture and neglected folk or immaterial forms (Smith 2006, 28). 
Furthermore, the concept of ‘outstanding universal value’, it was argued, substantiated 
an elitist view of cultural heritage, which needed to be ‘authentic’ in order to be 
preserved internationally – concepts which were all gauged as fostering an Eurocentric 
understanding2 of cultural heritage (Musitelli 2002, 229-330; Starn 2002, 8; Smith 2006, 
95-96). After several attempts to correct this ‘Eurocentric bias’, the UNESCO adopted 
the ICHC in 2003, aiming to complement the WHC by safeguarding traditional cultural 
practices (UNESCO 2003a).  
In contrast to the WHC, the new ICHC reflects a policy narrative change. In the 
preamble of the ICHC, the policy narrative of ‘heritage under threat’ was extended to 
not only include natural decay and socio-economic changes but also ‘globalization’ as 
causes of threat. Furthermore, new concepts were added to the value frame such as the 
necessity to safeguard ‘human rights’ and ‘cultural diversity’ (Preamble). As a reaction 
to the criticism of the WHC, the concepts of ‘outstanding universal value’ and 
‘authenticity’ were removed and replaced with an emphasis on ‘local community 
participation’. Since 2003, the new policy narrative of ‘(intangible cultural) heritage 
under threat’ thus tells the story of the inherent value of traditional culture for the local 
community who have the cultural right to safeguard ‘their history (…) [which] provides 
                                                 
2 Laurajane Smith (2006) has argued that the UNESCO, via its documents, Conventions and 
expert bodies, is disseminating an ‘authorized heritage discourse’ (AHD) which determines 
what heritage is and what it is not according to a Western understanding of heritage. 
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them with a sense of identity and continuity, thus promoting respect for cultural 
diversity and human creativity’ (Art. 2) from generation to generation. Again the ‘grave 
threats of deterioration, disappearance and destruction’ (Preamble) are to be 
counteracted by inventories (Art. 12), ‘scientific, technical and artistic studies, as well 
as research methodologies’, ‘appropriate legal, technical, administrative and financial 
measures’ (Art. 13) as well as ‘educational, awareness-raising and information 
programmes’ (Art. 14), providing an action frame for ICH safeguarding (UNESCO 
2003a). Both conventions thus created and disseminated a narrative of threatened, 
valuable traditional culture which needs protection by state and society.  
States Parties to the ICHC, like the WHC, pledge to safeguard ICH practices within 
their territory by creating safeguarding lists and ensuring the participation of local 
communities and NGOs in the safeguarding process. Comparable to the World Heritage 
List, States Parties may nominate an ICH practice to the UNESCO ICH Committee for 
inscription on the UNESCO Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of 
Humanity and List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need of Urgent Safeguarding 
(UNESCO 2003a). Yet, while the States Party may pledge to safeguard ICH practices, 
international inscription of ICH at the UNESCO transforms ICH practices into a 
resource for national prestige and economic development (Meskell 2013: 483), 
potentially creating a certain dissonance between the UNESCO policy narrative and 
States Party objectives. 
The Appropriation of UNESCO’s Policy Narrative in China 
UNESCO policy narratives are disseminated by the UNESCO, its States Parties, and 
transnational actors, such as academics, and subsequently appropriated by domestic 
actors through translation and congruence-building. The following subchapters will 
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examine how the ICHC’s policy narrative was appropriated by the Chinese party-state, 
focusing on how translation and congruence-building processes took place, why, and 
who was involved. 
Being part of international academic circles, Chinese academia had already employed 
UNESCO’s narrative of ‘heritage under threat’ before the party-state fully adopted it in 
its official discourse. While in the 1990s some articles focused on the UNESCO’s 
World Heritage Program or Chinese World Heritage Sites per se (Hu 1994; Chun 1998; 
Ji 2000), and directly alluded to the narrative, some scholars appropriated the policy 
narrative in a subtler way to advocate for the protection of cultural heritage. Xi’erweiniu 
and Zhong (1996), for instance, urged to increase governmental efforts to protect 
historical remains by repeatedly referring to the destructive forces of environmental 
pollution, plunder and tourism which cause an ‘imminent danger’ to valued heritage 
sites. Feng (1996) similarly uses the narrative of threat to draw attention to the loss of 
traditional cultural occupations, such as producing Chinese traditional ‘snacks’ (xiaochi) 
and performing traditional foot treatments. He calls for the ‘rescue of threatened trades’, 
as they are part of the motherland’s cultural heritage and a ‘treasure’ of traditional 
Chinese crafts, thus emphasizing a value frame by invoking patriotic sentiment and 
excellence. In the decades prior to the ICHC’ ratification, members of the Chinese 
scholarly community were thus not only aware of the ‘UNESCO policy narrative of 
threat’, but also attempted to appropriate it to demand greater governmental heritage 
protection.  
Academic debates impact governmental action in China, as government officials and 
scholars are linked and influence each other through ICH policy networks (Maags and 
Holbig 2016). After the party-state became increasingly interested in folklore protection 
and UNESCO ICH-related projects in the late 1990s, members of the Chinese academia 
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were asked to support the party-state in implementing the ICHC in China, including 
translating UNESCO discourses into Chinese (Interview 3/2014, 35/2015). Academics 
such as Liu Kuili or Bamo Qubumu, both working at the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, a state-affiliated research institute, advised the party-state in how to 
implement the ICHC in China (CASS 2006).  
Prior to ICHC ratification in 2004, various Chinese terms existed to describe traditional 
cultural practices, e.g. folk culture (minjian wenhua) or ethnic folk culture (minzu 
minjian wenhua). In the years leading to the ICHC, academics debated different 
approaches to translating ‘intangible cultural heritage’ into Chinese. While some 
favored the direct Japanese translation (wuxing wenhua yichan), meaning ‘non-form 
cultural heritage’, others advocated the use of a neologism, namely ‘non-tangible 
cultural heritage’ (feiwuzhi wenhua yichan), which does not make grammatical sense in  
Chinese (Bamo 2008). As the term does not match cultural understandings, some 
scholars noted that it appears unfamiliar and distant to the public. As a national-level 
ICH scholar argued, ‘There is no expression for ICH in Chinese. We historically have 
not considered anything “intangible” (Interview 07/2014). Striving to rapidly implement 
the ICHC domestically, the party-state settled for the latter translation (feiwuzhi wenhua 
yichan) making it the official Chinese translation in China and at the UNESCO. Debates 
within Chinese academia prior to the ICHC thus influenced the official translation and 
congruence-building of UNESCO’s policy narrative in China.  
After this translation became official, the term ICH became a label to rebrand ICH 
practices and policies in China. As mentioned above, Chinese had previously referred to 
traditional cultural practices as “(ethnic) folk culture” ((minzu) minjian wenhua). 
Therefore, in the early 2000s the party-state had started to implement ‘folk culture 
protection projects’ (IHChina 2018). According to a national-level ICH expert ‘After 
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China joined in 2004, we took “folk culture protection” and changed it into “ICH 
protection” (…) our so-called folk culture protection projects are actually very similar 
to these [ICH safeguarding] models’ (Interview 04/2015). The term ICH thus replaced 
the term ‘folk culture’. This had considerable consequences, as one provincial-level 
expert explained: ‘Previously people may have considered (these practices) as bad, as 
superstition, because they are an ancient way of doing things. But now, because there is 
ICH, much more culture can be protected’ (Interview 37/2015). The ICH term thus 
provided an opportunity to create a new label for traditional culture in China and 
associated policies. How ICH is protected has also partially changed, as another ICH 
national-level expert argued. Since joining the ICHC, the creation of safeguarding lists, 
for instance, has become a key feature in domestic heritage work (Interview 55/2015). 
With the translation of the ICHC into Chinese (see UNESCO 2003b) and the adoption 
of ICH policies, the policy narrative of ‘ICH under threat’ entered the official Chinese 
heritage discourse. Examining the Chinese ICH law which was drafted – in cooperation 
with Chinese academics - in 2005 and finally adopted in 2011, both UNESCO policy 
narratives (WHC and ICHC) are clearly visible. Article 17, for instance, stipulates that 
‘with regard to the items of intangible cultural heritage that are on the verge of 
extinction (…) [governmental agencies] shall immediately record and collect the 
relevant physical objects or adopt other rescue and preservation measures’ (WIPO 
2011). While the basic problem frame of ‘heritage under threat’ was adopted in the law 
by referring to its ‘extinction’ and its need to be ‘rescued’, the law furthermore mirrors 
value and action frames from the WHC and ICHC. In accordance with UNESCO’s 
policy narratives, ICH’s ‘historical, literary, artistic or scientific value’ (Art. 3) and 
‘authenticity’ are to be preserved to maintain a ‘cultural identity’ and ensure 
‘sustainable development’ (Art. 4). Furthermore, the law emphasizes that ICH is in fact 
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the ‘distinguished traditional culture of the Chinese nation’, pointing to a more elitist 
emphasis similar to the notion of ‘outstanding universal value’.  
At the same time, however, the law also includes Chinese political concepts such as 
‘maintaining the unification of the country and the unity of the nation and promoting 
social harmony’ (also Art.4) which all refer to the party-state’s ideological narrative of 
‘socialist harmonious society’ (Hong 2010) and the ‘unified multi-ethnic state’ 
(China.org 2016). The Chinese ICH law thus includes concepts which were part of 
UNESCO’s WHC (authenticity, outstanding culture), ICHC (cultural identity, 
sustainable development) as well as Chinese political narratives. Furthermore, many 
elements of UNESCO’s action frame were included in the law, such as establishing 
inventories, conducting research, enhancing awareness-building and public participation 
in ICH safeguarding (Art. 8, 9, 11-21). The Chinese ICH law thus reflects both the 
WHC and ICHC narratives as well as Chinese political ideology.  
The adoption of UNESCO’s policy narrative in Chinese legislation is even more evident 
in China’s main ICH policies issued by the State Council. In the State Council’s 
Opinion on Concerning Strengthening China’s Intangible Cultural Heritage Protection 
Work of 2005, ICH is said to face ‘imminent extinction’, ‘continued loss’ (Art. 1) and 
‘imminent danger’ (Art.2.) due to the ‘increasing trend of globalization’, the ‘abrupt 
economic and social change’ (Preamble) and ‘modernization’ (Art. 1), thereby 
explicitly mirroring the problem frame employed in UNESCO’s policy narrative within 
the ICHC. According to the 2005 policy, ICH is of ‘historic, cultural and scientific 
value’ and ‘precious’. Therefore its ‘authenticity’ (Art. 2), inherent ‘cultural identity’ 
and ‘cultural rights’ need to be preserved to ensure a ‘sustainable development’ (Art.1) 
(SC 2005) and because traditional culture is the carrier of ‘humanity’s social civilization’ 
and the ‘world’s cultural diversity’ (Art.1.). This reflects UNESCO’s concept of world 
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heritage. Finally, in explaining the reasoning, the policy points to the ‘urgency’ and 
‘importance’ of ICH protection work (Art. 1). All these concepts make up the value 
frame inherent in the Chinese version of the policy narrative.  
To summarize, the 2005 policy clearly reiterates UNESCO’s policy narrative by 
pointing to the threat of globalization, socio-economic change and modernization 
towards ICH (problem frame). Furthermore, it emphasizes the ICHC’s value frame: that 
ICH is valuable for safeguarding cultural diversity, rights and identity. Like the ICH law, 
the 2005 policy thus also combines frames and concepts mentioned in both the WHC 
and the ICHC. Moreover, the narrative also includes Chinese political ideology such as 
the ‘scientific outlook on development’ - a concept stipulated by President Hu Jintao in 
2004. This concept includes a call for enhancing ‘sustainable development’ (Holbig 
2009, 48), and fostering ‘patriotic education’ - a governmental slogan since the early 
1990s (Zhao 1998). A comparison of the policy narrative inherent in WHC, ICHC and 
Chinese national laws and policies is summarized in Figure 2. 
Figure 2. Comparing Policy Narratives within Heritage Conventions and Chinese 
ICH Laws and Policies 
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 (Source: Author) 
 
The congruence-building process by which the UNESCO’s “narrative of threat” was 
appropriated in China thus occurred in various steps. First UNESCO documents and 
inherent narratives had to be translated into Chinese, which then were used to draft 
policies and laws. To achieve congruence between preexisting and new narratives and 
to align UNESCO narratives with domestic political objectives, the Chinese party-state 
combined previously existing, political ideological concepts with UNESCO narratives. 
Interestingly, however, the Chinese “narrative of threat” includes frames of both the 
WHC and the ICHC. This combination could be based on a misunderstanding of the 
difference between the narratives employed in the WHC and ICHC. Yet it appears more 
plausible that the party-state actively chose to emphasize the ‘excellence’ and 
‘authenticity” of Chinese heritage, thus its value frame, since enhancing the value of 
ICH among the populace would foster national pride and enhance ICH’s economic 
value as well.  
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By strategically integrating UNESCO’s policy narrative in Chinese national legislation, 
the party-state not only demonstrates compliance with UNESCO objectives by 
preserving ‘cultural diversity’ and ‘cultural rights’ for a global ‘sustainable 
development’, but also legitimizes Chinese policies internationally and domestically. At 
the same time, these objectives resonate with the preexisting political ideology and 
propaganda: Firstly, the party-state promotes the ‘united multi-ethnic state’ narrative 
used to more strongly integrate Chinese ethnic minorities, such as the Tibetans, in the 
nation-state (Shepherd 2009). Secondly, it substantiates the party-state’s ‘people-
centered outlook’, incorporated in Hu Jintao’s concept of ‘scientific outlook on 
development’ and ‘harmonious society’, which has the aims, among others, to respond 
to ‘people’s growing and increasingly diverse material and cultural needs, (…) the 
appearance of all sorts of thoughts and cultures (…) and growing enthusiasm for 
political participation’ (Holbig 2009, 50-51). Thirdly, by preserving and promoting 
China’s traditional culture, the party-state fosters cultural nationalism among the 
populace, a political objective since the 1990s (Guo 2003, xii).  
Since UNESCO’s policy narrative is in line with various political ideological concepts 
of the CCP and can be strategically appropriated to promote its objectives, the party-
state eagerly adopted the narrative to fit its domestic needs. Yet, while it is striking that 
the party-state has adopted so many UNESCO terms and concepts, especially that of 
cultural rights, a human right, this does not imply that its protection is actually enforced 
and can be claimed by the populace. The Chinese party-state always prioritizes ‘social 
stability’ over citizens’ rights (Kent 1999, 165, 202-203).  
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Moreover, the Chinese version of the narrative of ‘heritage under threat’ has also 
undergone changes over time. Whereas the notion of cultural rights is mentioned in the 
landmark policy of 2005 (SC 2005), it is not mentioned in the 2011 ICH law (SC 2011), 
indicating that it was subsequently dropped. UNESCO concepts have been replaced by 
indigenous ones: The party-state has, for instance, developed various slogans for ICH 
safeguarding, such as ‘Safeguarding as the principle issue, rescuing comes first, rational 
use, transmitting development’ (baohu weiyi, qiangjou diyi, heli liyong, chuancheng 
fazhan) (SC 2005). This evolution of policy narratives over time suggests that 
congruence-building does not stop after the initial appropriation takes place, but is a 
continuous, country-specific process in which foreign narratives are more strongly 
integrated in domestic political discourses and narratives.Circulating the Policy 
Narrative via State Media and Academic Publications 
The new, official Chinese version of UNESCO’s policy narrative was subsequently 
disseminated through state media. An analysis of the reporting of the People’s Daily, 
the mouth-piece of the CCP (Wu 1994), before and after the PRC’s ratification of the 
ICHC in 2004 exemplifies how the party-state uses the media to spread its version of 
the policy narrative. Examining all People’s Daily articles from 1949 to 20173 using 
‘cultural heritage’4 and other key words5 as employed in the 2005 ICH policy, we can 
                                                 
3 The author used the Crossasia.org database of the People’s Daily to obtain data from 1949 to 
2012. As the database ends in 2012, the 2013 to 2017 data was retrieved from the CNKI 
database of the People’s Daily, which ranges from 1979 to the present. 
4 The key word ‘cultural heritage’ was used instead of ‘intangible cultural heritage’, as the 
results of the analysis will refer to all articles on tangible and intangible cultural heritage and 
highlight how often the key words used were included in earlier articles during the 1990s, 
when ICH as a term was not used in China. 
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see that after ratification, the use of terms like ‘threat’, ‘imminent danger’, ‘disappear’, 
‘die out’, ‘attack’ and ‘rescue’ in conjunction with ‘cultural heritage’ has increased 
drastically in People’s Daily articles. The results of this analysis are depicted in Figure 3 
below.  
Figure 3. The People’s Daily and the Narrative of ‘Heritage under Threat’ 
 
(Source: Analysis by the author; data obtained through the Crossasia.org 
database) 
                                                                                                                                               
5 As Chinese laws, policies and media articles often employ official discourses in a verbatim 
manner, the author chose to select central key words from the State Council’s 2005 policy to 
identify the policy narrative in texts. However, the author is aware that the same narrative 
may also be told using non-official words. 
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Although a few articles did associate heritage with threat prior to 2004, particularly 
during the 1950s 6 , the narrative was not prevalent or widespread. The association 
between heritage and threat again increased after 1978, most probably due to China’s 
exposure to the international community and UNESCO membership. However, the 
stark increase in articles only occurs after 2003/2004, indicating that the party-state is 
more actively spreading the narrative of ‘Chinese heritage under threat’ since ICHC 
adoption. People’s Daily articles depict Chinese ICH as being in need of ‘rescue’ 
(qiangjiu) from ‘attacks’ (chongji) or threats, which may result in it ‘disappearing’ 
(xiaowang). Therefore, it needs rescue and protection by state and society. Finally, the 
articles commonly highlight Chinese heritage’s ‘excellence’, ‘radiating charm’ (meili) 
or ‘charisma’ (ganranli) (Maags and Trifu 2018 forthcoming) as part of the value frame. 
The number of articles peaked during 2013, after which state media reduced the use of 
the narrative, potentially due to a shift in priorities after the leadership change in 2012 
when Xi Jinping replaced Hu Jintao. 
In addition to circulating the narrative via state media, government officials also use it 
in speeches. In 2005, the Minister of Culture, Sun Jiazheng (1998-2008), for instance, 
published an article explicitly referring to the narrative of threat. He argued that  
In recent years, ICH protection is facing serious challenges [as it is] under the 
attack of economic globalization and modern civilization. (…)  Modernization is 
destroying traditional culture with extraordinary and rapid ruthlessness and the 
cultural environment is undergoing violent change. Therefore ICH increasingly 
                                                 
6 During the 1950s, People’s Daily articles created a narrative in which the threat of American 
imperialism was in part associated with destroying heritage in China and in other countries 
of the Global South. 
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losing the [social] environment it needs to exist and develop. Many ICH 
[practices] are facing eradication or imminent threat (PD 2005). 
Similarly, the next Minister of Culture, Cai Wu (2008-2014), explained in an interview 
that ‘During the processes of globalization, urbanization and industrialization, Chinese 
traditional artistry cannot avoid being attacked. [For this reason] many people 
transmitting artistry are under imminent threat’ (MOC 2009). Using the keywords 
employed in the policy narrative, government officials thus consciously highlight that 
globalization and modernization are threatening traditional Chinese culture to promote 
its protection by state and society. In particular, the party-state portrays itself as the 
“protector” of Chinese heritage (Maags and Trifu 2018 forthcoming). 
In disseminating this policy narrative of ‘heritage under threat’, the party-state 
strategically uses a problem and value frame to mobilize support for its policies and 
safeguarding measures. Through national dissemination via laws, policies, media and so 
forth, the party-state has created its own version of UNESO’s policy narrative which, 
after appropriation, has now become part of the official discourse on Chinese ICH 
safeguarding. Since the party-state  
maintains control over the avenues of political expression by a multitude of 
means (…) [and] exercises direct control over political discourse by way of 
centralized management and manipulation of “appropriate” and “inappropriate” 
formulations (…) they set out to regulate what is being said and what is being 
written - and by extension what is being done (Schoenhals 1992, 3). 
Knowing the explicit terms used in the party-state’s policy narrative is thus conducive 
to making claims of any form, since their use legitimizes action. The use of official 
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discourses or narratives is therefore a common strategy by non-state actors to discuss 
and potentially criticize governmental action.  
While the UNESCO’s policy narrative of “heritage under threat” was present in some 
academic articles prior to 2003, its use sharply increased after ICHC ratification. A 
search for articles on cultural heritage and the threat-related keywords mentioned above 
in the China Academic Journal database7 yields similar results as in the People’s Daily 
analysis. As Figure 4 demonstrates, whereas only a small number of academic articles 
included the ‘narrative of threat’ 8  before ratification (1949 - 2002), the number of 
articles skyrocketed after 2004. 
[Insert Figure 4 approximately here] 
As Figure 4 shows, academic articles started to use the official narrative particularly 
after the ICHC’s ratification in 2004 and adoption of the 2005 ICH policy. Again, terms 
such as ‘attack’, ‘rescue’ and ‘disappear’ are employed in more articles than the terms 
‘threat’, ‘imminent threat’ and ‘die out’, mirroring the results of the People’s Daily 
analysis. Compared to the UNESCO narrative, the official Chinese policy narrative, as 
                                                 
7  The China Academic Journal (CAJ) database is compiled by the prestigious Tsinghua 
University and contains all articles of China’s most frequently read academic journals from 
1949 to today in some cases also from the pre-PRC era. As in the analysis of People’s Daily 
articles, the search was conducted using the keyword ‘cultural heritage’ (subject) in 
combination with one threat-related keyword (full-text), namely ‘threat’, ‘imminent danger’, 
‘disappear’, ‘die out’, ‘attack’ and ‘rescue’. The CAJ database is available via Crossasia.org.  
8 Articles featuring the term ‘cultural heritage’ and at least one of the identified keywords are 
considered to include the ‘narrative of threat’. In most cases, the articles, however, included 
more than one of the keywords.  
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reflected in media and academic articles, thus emphasizes the more emotional concepts 
of ‘attack’ and ‘rescue’. This suggests a strategic decision to foster emotional ties to 
heritage, evoking a moral obligation to rescue - a term with positive connotation - 
Chinese cultural heritage under attack.  
The extent to which and the way the articles employ the policy narrative varies from 
article to article. Bai (2008), for instance, opens his article by arguing that ‘ICH is not a 
renewable resource. Accompanied by the acceleration of globalization and 
modernization processes, a huge change is happening in China’s cultural environment; 
cultural heritage and the environment it exists in are under serious threat’ (2008, 3). 
Citing UNESCO conventions, the party-state’s ICH laws, policies and slogans, he calls 
for greater ICH protection, particularly of traditional martial arts, to preserve its 
‘important value’ and by extension ‘global cultural diversity’. Similarly, Fan (2005), 
calls attention to the crisis facing ‘weak’ languages due to industrialization, 
globalization and Westernization. For the sake of creating a ‘harmonious society’ and 
preserving ‘cultural diversity’, the state needs emphasize studying ‘endangered 
languages’, including them in school curricula and granting cultural rights. 
Globalization and modernization are also the culprits in Feng’s (2006) article, in which 
he argues that ‘what makes people feel anxious is, that a lot of unique traditional music 
is being lost. Many of the folk musicians who have exceptional skills, body and mind, 
are getting old and their health is declining, so that there is a crisis since no people are 
left who can carry on this skill’ (2006, 38).  
To gain more governmental attention and investment in ICH safeguarding, these 
scholars thus very explicitly appropriate the official policy narrative, copying the exact 
phrases and concepts employed in the UNESCO and PRC official documents. In doing 
so, they not only legitimize their claim but also critique the current situation. Using 
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official policy narratives is a common strategy for actors to make claims vis-à-vis or 
criticize the party-state since ‘official statements define the limits of permissible debate 
and create a politically safe framework within which analysts can express their views. 
Published analysis often explicitly refers to official policy, and analysts frequently 
restate policy verbatim on sensitive issues (…)’ (Chen 2003, 296). When the authors 
incorporate the narrative in a subtler way, scholars often attempt to legitimize their 
claim through other means such as applying Chinese and international scientific theories 
and methods (Cheng and Ling 2013; Maags and Holbig 2016). Other forms of expertise 
or prestige can thus similarly be used to legitimize a claim for ICH protection. 
Compared to the articles from the 1990s, scholarly articles published after the ICHC’s 
ratification display a more explicit use of the new official narrative by, for instance, 
identifying globalization and modernization as the main threats to ICH and 
incorporating concepts such as cultural diversity and cultural rights. All in all, Chinese 
academics contribute to the creation and dissemination of the policy narrative of 
‘heritage under threat’ by circulating it through their publications. 
The Strategic Implementation of the Policy Narrative 
Top-down implementation processes of national policies ensure that these narratives are 
transferred to subnational government levels. Jiangxi province’s ICH policy of 2015, for 
instance, reiterates the narrative of threat by arguing that ICH subject to ‘imminent 
threat’ should be preserved by immediate ‘rescue’ measures (Art.23-24). Since ‘Chinese 
outstanding traditional culture’ is of ‘historic, literary, artistic and scientific value’ (Art. 
15), its ‘authenticity’ should be preserved (Art. 4) through publicity and awareness-
building events (Art. 7), an expert system (Art. 11) as well as ICH Inheritors (Art. 14) 
(JXCB 2015). This strong use of the official policy narrative can also be found in other 
provinces such as Henan (NYCB 2013) and Sichuan (SCCB 2014), while some 
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provinces, such as Zhejiang, Jiangsu and Yunnan incorporate the narrative to a lesser 
degree. In the case of Yunnan, policies at first continued to use the term “ethnic folk 
culture” instead of ICH (i.e. YNCD 2005), thus resisting the appropriation of UNESCO 
concepts locally. As Yunnan has a large ethnic minority population, it may have chosen 
to continue using the former concept which is more familiar to the local population. 
There are thus differences across China concerning to what extent the policy narrative is 
adopted in subnational policies and whether appropriated or pre-existing terms are used. 
This variation in subnational policy narratives can be explained by subnational 
governments’ leeway in policy formulation and implementation (Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg 1988). Provincial ICH policies therefore can merely include elements of the 
national policy narrative, such as the need to ‘rescue’ ‘authentic’, ‘endangered ICH’ 
(see JSCB 2006; ZJCB 2007; YNCB 2013). Lower government levels thus contribute to 
the spread of official policy narratives, as they, often in a verbatim manner (Schoenhals 
1992), incorporate national policy narratives into their own policies. Yet, as they adapt 
national policy narratives to fit subnational understandings and interests, these national 
narratives are again transformed along the way down to the local level. Through this 
trickling down of policy narratives, however, subnational governments may also 
strategically use them to legitimize policies which contradict ICH safeguarding. Jiangxi 
province’s cultural department’s 2007 policy, for instance, states that officials ‘should 
make use of every region’s outstanding ICH practices (…) and depend on them to 
develop cultural and tourism products as well as the cultural industry’ (Art. 5, JXCD 
2007). Although the narrative of ‘heritage under threat’ does raise awareness for the 
need to safeguard ICH against processes of modernization, state and non-state actors in 
China and elsewhere have often used UNESCO narratives to legitimize the promotion 
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of ICH practices for economic development, for instance through the tourism industry 
(Wang and Bramwell 2012), undermining the original purpose of the narrative.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the party-state strategically appropriated UNESCO’s policy narrative of 
‘heritage under threat’ to influence public opinion, legitimize policy choices and trigger 
action. To do so, the party-state amalgamated frames and concepts inherent in two 
UNESCO Conventions, the WHC and ICHC, as well as elements of domestic political 
ideology to create its own appropriated version of the UNESCO policy narrative. This 
process was facilitated by Chinese academics, supporting the translation and policy 
formulation process. After domestic appropriation, the policy narrative has continued to 
transform over time and across Chinese geographical regions and administrative levels. 
Chinese academia and state media further disseminate the Chinese policy narrative of 
‘heritage under threat’, highlighting certain aspects of the narrative such as the 
emotional notions of ‘attack’ and ‘rescue’. 
Although based on a single case study, and not a comparison of democratic and 
authoritarian countries, the study points to some specific features of policy narratives in 
authoritarian systems. One might expect that because the PRC is a one-party state, non-
state actors are excluded from the political processes. Nevertheless, academics were 
involved in translation and policy formulation. However, the party-state has the final 
word on how concepts are translated and how congruence is built, for instance, by 
explicitly incorporating concepts of CCP ideology and propaganda. The state 
subsequently steers the circulation of this officially-sanctioned policy narrative: on the 
one hand, through actively circulating it through state-controlled media, and on the 
other hand through setting indirect boundaries of what can and cannot be said. 
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Nevertheless, (local) state and non-state actors can misappropriate the policy narrative 
to pursue their own interests: either to lobby for greater governmental heritage 
protection or to legitimize subnational efforts of economic development. The 
appropriation of UNESCO’s narrative of “heritage under threat” has thus produced a 
Chinese policy narrative which may foster domestic political and economic objectives, 
while also providing a “safe framework” to indirectly criticize the party-state.   
In constructing policy narratives, actors commonly refer to values, problems and actions 
or solutions. The policy narrative of “heritage under threat” thereby tells the story of 
why heritage is valuable, what is threatening it and how it can be protected. Using frame 
analysis to examine policy narratives sheds light on the policy process in various 
manners: Firstly, it can highlight the strategic ways in which certain narratives are taken 
up in policy-related texts and speeches. Secondly, it can shed light on who integrates 
these narratives into policy and thus introduces them into the policy process. Finally, by 
retracing the strategic implementation of the policy narrative across government levels 
and over time, we can assess how narratives continue to transform during the 
subsequent stages of the policy process. There are, however, a few limitations to this 
study. As it has focused on retracing terms and frames employed in the UNESCO and 
Chinese policy narratives, it overlooks more subtle uses of the narrative or alternative 
discourses and is not able to detect to what extent actors have internalized the narrative. 
Secondly, as the study is based on a single authoritarian country, it lacks the insights a 
comparative case study, including democratic and authoritarian states, could generate. 
More research needs to be done concerning how and to what extent international 
discourses and policy narratives are appropriated, especially how these differ across 
regime types and geographical regions. 
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